By Clarence Irving Lewis
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During this vital new paintings, Haack develops an unique idea of empirical facts or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the targets of inquiry. In so doing, Haack offers distinctive severe case reviews of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's 'epistemology with no realizing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' contemporary obituaries of epistemology.
The idea that of likeness to fact, like that of fact itself, is key to a realist perception of inquiry. to illustrate this we'd like purely make really modest target of an inquiry, as an inquiry, is realist assumptions: the reality doctrine (that the the reality of a few subject) and the growth doctrine (that one fake idea may perhaps recognize this goal higher than another).
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23 24 An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge believing that (f). Now, suppose that Smith has another friend, Brown, whose whereabouts are unknown to Smith. Smith selects some place names at random and deduces from (f) the following: (g) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. (h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. (i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Since Smith is justified in believing (f) and sees that (f) entails (g)À(i), he is justified in believing each of them.
Still, given the realistic holographic image, it seems that your perceptual belief is justified. But now let’s suppose that your belief is also true À there is a man in the room. He’s simply not visible to you from the doorway. In this case, your belief that there is a man in the room is true and justified, but it is not an instance of knowledge. 25 26 An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge This seems to be another case in which we have a justified true belief that is not knowledge. But note that in this case your justified true belief is not formed by inferring it from some other justified belief.
Finally, in Case 3 what makes it true that (l), someone in my office owns a Ford, is the fact that Brown owns a Ford. But again the fact that Brown owns a Ford is not connected in any appropriate way with Smith’s belief in (l). He cannot give a proper reconstruction from the fact that Brown owns a Ford to his belief in (l). D12 appears to yield the right results in Cases 1, 2, and 3. In spite of its success in dealing with Gettier’s original cases and some variations thereof, D12 faces some rather serious objections.